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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 as this 
is an appeal from the District Court involving a domestic relations case. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-311, which states: If an actual loss or injury to a party in an 
action or special proceeding is caused by the contempt, the court, in lieu of or in addition to the 
fine and imprisonment imposed for the contempt, may order the person proceeded against to pay 
the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient to indemnify him and to satisfy his and expenses. 
The order and the acceptance of money under it is a bar to an action by the aggrieved party for 
the loss and injury. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a lower court order holding the Appellant, Ms. Trisha Taylor, in 
contempt of court for not paying a property settlement payment timely and for not successfully 
purging the contempt. Ms Taylor was sentenced to thirty days in the Tooele County Jail, which 
she served in its entirety. She was also ordered to pay a $1,000 fine and to pay the Appellee, Mr. 
Paul Taylor, his attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $5,213.39. 
Initially, Ms. Taylor filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief, which was denied. Her 
Notice of Appeal was filed on March 31, 2010. 
OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellee objects to the following portions of Appellant's Statement of Facts on the 
grounds that they are unsupported by the record, inaccurately supported by the record, or 
constitute argument, not facts. 
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1. Paragraph 8 states: " On July 14, 2009, Ms. Taylor sent an email to the special 
master stating that, contrary to his Report, she did not consent to the obtaining of a passport for 
the child " (R. 02013; R.02086 at 19; 02044-42.) Ms. Taylor's email actually said " I would 
like to restate that I did go along with your suggestion to cooperate with Paul at a considerable 
expense of time last Spring and he did not have the correct paperwork as previously explained. 
Certain circumstances have changed since then. Please realize I am not trying to be recalcitrant, 
only avoid future conflict about where they can travel and when. Why would it be in the best 
interest of the children to do this? Frankly, they are exhausted by the amount of travel they have 
had this summer!" ( R. 02013.) 
2. Paragraph 21 states: " Mrs. Taylor explained [to Judge Henriod] that she had 
contacted Mr. Taylor and "sent him many emails" to make the necessary arrangements for 
payment of the $41,000." (R. 02086 - 5-6; R. 02047.) Ms. Taylor actually told Judge Henriod: 
"I don't feel like in any way I have told them I wasn't going to pay it, that it wasn't due. I've 
sent them many, many emails about paying that, and that - requested that it be paid out of the 
closing of my business." (R. 02086, page 6.) 
3. Paragraph 27 states: "Ms. Taylor also explained at the January Hearing that she 
was concerned about providing the passports for the children to Mr. Taylor because Mr. Taylor 
was out of work and she was concerned he would try to flee with the children." (R. 02086, at 
19.") What Ms. Taylor actually said was " I said " I agreed with your original order. I did 
cooperate with Paul." I asked him, "Now that you know that I have opposed getting passports for 
the children, because we have no relatives outside, because they've had very negative travel 
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experiences, and because of their young age of 7 and 9, and a lot of other evidence that shows 
they should not be traveling alone outside the country with their dad," I said, Now that you know 
my stand on that, if you want to make an additional order that I comply, then you can do that." 
(R. 02086, at 19.) 
4. Paragraph 37 states:"Mr. Taylor did not pick up the check, claiming his counsel 
did not receive the communication until 4:30 p.m." {Id.){ citing R. 2075.) R. 2075 is a Notice of 
Hearing which does not address why Mr. Taylor did not pick up the check. 
5. Paragraph 44 states: " As for the passport, Ms. Taylor signed the passport 
application for the younger child within five days of the January Hearing to obtain the passport 
as ordered. Although she included the notation "under duress," with her signature, she did not 
believe that this notation would prevent Mr. Taylor from obtaining a passport for the minor 
child." (citing R. 02118, at 3.) What Ms. Taylor actually said was "With respect to the passport, 
as far as federal law goes only one parent needs to give consent if there is a court order in place, 
and all that needs to be attached [to the application] is a document stating that there is a court 
order in place." 
6. Paragraph 45 states: "To the contrary, Ms. Taylor repeatedly notified Mr. Taylor, 
and the district court, that a copy of the court order would be sufficient for the minor child to 
obtain a passport without her signature." (R. 02118, at 3.) Ms. Taylor cites to only one such 
incident. (R. 02118, at 3.) 
7. Paragraph 47 states: " In fact, Mr. Taylor was able to obtain a passport for the 
minor child based on the documents presented." Appellant provides no citation to the record 
supporting this fact. 
8. Paragraph 48 of Appellant's Statement of Facts states: "Despite Ms. Taylor's 
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compliance with the Court's order, on February 5,2010, Mr. Taylor's counsel filed an affidavit, 
representing to the court that Ms. Taylor had not satisfied the conditions for purging the 
contempt." (R. 02096 - 02094.) "Despite Ms. Taylor's compliance with the Court's order...." 
should be stricken since it is argument, not fact. 
9. Paragraph 51 states: "At the February Hearing, Ms. Taylor explained to the court 
that she had tendered the $41,000 check to Mr. Taylor within the time frame provided but was 
unable to arrange delivery with him until the next morning as directed by Mr. Taylor's counsel, 
despite her best efforts." (R. 02118, at 3.) What Ms. Taylor actually said was: "The $41,000 I 
had ready within 24 hours. I did not know that the petitioner would not pick the check up. I just 
didn't think that was going to be a problem. As soon as we found out that he would not pick it 
up, I drove over to my accountant's office and drove to his home to drop it off. He wasn't 
there." (R. 02118, at 3.) Ms. Taylor said nothing about "tendering," the check, which is a term 
of law and even her statement that she had the money ready within the 24 hours, is directly 
contradicted by her accountant's letter to Ms. Schmid, indicating the check would not be 
available until 4:30 p.m. - 30 minutes late. (R. 02092.) 
10. Paragraph 52 states: " Ms. Taylor informed the Court that she had signed the 
passport application for the minor child and that it was her understanding that Mr. Taylor would 
be able to obtain the passport with or without her signature." (Id. , at 3-4.) What Ms. Taylor 
actually said was is sent forth in paragraph 4 above. 
11. Paragraph 54 states: " Despite the fact that Ms. Taylor complied with the court's 
order from the January Hearing by taking all necessary action to have the passport issued within 
five days and by tendering the $41,000 to Mr. Taylor and his counsel within 24 hours, the court 
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nonetheless found Ms. Taylor in contempt, sentenced her to serve 30 days jail and imposed a 
$1,000 fine." (R. 02117.) The Court found Ms. Taylor in contempt, sentenced her to serve 30 
days jail and imposed a $1,000 fine. The rest of this statement should be stricken as argument. 
12. Paragraph 59 states: " Ms. Taylor served 30 days in jail, paid a $1,000 fine and 
also paid Mr. Taylor's attorney's fees." Appellant provides no citation to the record supporting 
any of these facts, and Ms. Taylor has neither paid the $1,000 fine (as evidenced by the balance 
for contempt shown for Case No. 054300395, which is not part of the record) nor has she paid 
the attorney's fees and costs of $5,213.39, though not in the record, is implied from the absence 
of a satisfaction of judgment. 
APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Taylor filed his Verified Petition for Dissolution of Marriage on November 
14,2005, in the Third Judicial District Court for Tooele County, State of Utah, Taylor v. Taylor, 
Case No 054300395 DA . (R.00016.) 
2. On November 25, 2005, Kathleen McConkie accepted service of the Verified 
Petition "on behalf of [her] client Trisha Richard Taylor." (R.00017.) 
3. On December 2, 2005, Mr. Taylor's attorney, Graden P. Jackson, served the First 
Combined Discovery Requests on Ms. McConkie. (R.00018.) 
4. On December 15, 2005, Ms. Taylor filed Respondent's Answer to Complaint, 
which she had prepared and filed herself, despite Ms. McConkie having appeared on her behalf. 
(R.00021-00024.) 
5. On March 6, 2006, Mr. Taylor filed his first Motion to Compel, seeking 
responses to the First Combined Discovery Requests, along with an award of attorney's fees and 
costs. (R.00025 - 00026.) 
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6. On March 28, 2006, Judge Randall Skanchy issued a Minute Entry and Order 
finding that Ms. Taylor had not answered the discovery "despite repeated demands." (R. 00048). 
Ms. Taylor was ordered to provide responses within 10 days and pay Mr. Taylor's attorney's 
fees and costs. (R. 00047 - 00048). 
7. On April 6, 2006, J. Bruce Reading appeared on behalf of Ms. Taylor. (R. 00049 
- 00050.) 
8. On April 16, 2006, Mr. Taylor asked that Ms. Taylor's default be entered because 
she had not provided her discovery responses as ordered. (R. 00056- 00057.) On April 17, 
2006, Judge Skanchy struck Ms. Taylor's answer and entered a default judgment against her. 
(R. 00059-00060.) 
9. On April 25, 2006, Ms. Taylor moved to set aside the default judgment. 
(R.00090- 00091.) In his Opposition, Mr. Taylor argued that she had not complied with the 
order because she had not provided any documents, including the " 4 crates of documents, over 
2,000 pages, " which she had promised to deliver on April 7, 2006. (Id.) (R. 00104, 00108.) 
On June 2, 2006, Judge Skanchy set aside Ms. Taylor's default but awarded Mr. Taylor a 
judgment for attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $2,014.00. (R. 00113 - 00114.) 
10. On June 7, 2006, Mr. Reading withdrew as Ms. Taylor's counsel. (R. 00115-
00116.) On June 16, 2006, Frederick N. Green appeared as counsel of record for Ms. 
Taylor. (R. 00119- 00120.) 
11. On September 28, 2006, Mr. Taylor filed his Second Motion to Compel, based on 
Ms. Taylor's continuing failure to respond to the First Combined Discovery Requests from 
December, 2005. ( R. 00176 - 00177.) In support, Mr. Taylor reiterated that despite Ms. 
Taylor's initial promise of four crates containing 2000 pages, only a limited number of 
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documents had been provided. (R. 00268). In addition, Mr. Taylor described how his attorney 
had notified Mr. Green in June, 2006, that the documents Ms. Taylor had provided were 
"woefully inadequate;" (R. 00268, 00246-00247), that in July, 2006, Mr. Graden provided a 
letter detailing the discovery deficiencies; (R. 00239-00242, 00244-00245, 00267) and in 
September, 2006, Mr. Green finally forwarded Ms. Taylor's Affidavit, along with a mere 35 
additional pages of documents. (R. 00267, 00129-00235.) 
12. Mr. Graden's June 19, 2006, letter to Mr. Green also made the first request to 
schedule Ms. Taylor's deposition. (R. 00247.) 
13. On March 16, 2007, Judge Mark Kouris entered the bifurcated Decree of Divorce. 
(R. 00414-00416.) 
14. At a temporary order hearing on April 2, 2007, the Court accepted the parties' 
stipulation that a custody evaluation be performed by Dr. Valerie Hale, with the cost of the 
evaluation shared equally, reserving the ultimate allocation for trial. (R. 00699 - 00700.) 
15. By letter dated April 24, 2007, Mr. Taylor's new attorney, Gayanne K. Schmid, 
made a second attempt to schedule Ms. Taylor's deposition with Mr. Green. (R. 00555-556.) 
16. Mr. Taylor's Second Motion to Compel (originally filed in September, 2006, and 
seeking documents requested in December, 2005) finally came on for hearing on June 11, 2007. 
(R. 00617- 00618.) In support, Mr. Taylor detailed his further drawn out efforts to obtain the 
requested documents, which had delayed the hearing by eight months, (R. 00544 - 616), as 
follows: 
a. On October 12, 2006, in lieu of producing documents, Mr. Green offered Mr. 
Taylor access to Ms. Taylor's financial records at the offices of her accountant. (R. 00609, 
00563, 0565.) When Mr. Taylor contacted the accountant, however, he learned he needed Ms. 
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Taylor's written permission, which had not been given. (Id.) 
b. On November 7,2006, Ms. Taylor asked to talk to her accountant first before Mr. 
Taylor met with him and then persuaded Mr. Taylor to postpone the meeting further, until after 
Thanksgiving. (R. 00608 - 00609, 00561 - 00562.) Ms. Taylor then asked Mr. Taylor to 
postpone the meeting a third time, until the middle of December. (Id.) 
c. At a hearing on April 2, 2007, when Ms. Schmid again complained about the lack of 
production of documents, Mr. Green once again extended the invitation to review the records at 
the accountant's office, but when Mr. Taylor tried to schedule a meeting, he learned the 
accountant was unavailable until after April 24. (R. 00608, 00560.) 
d. On April 10, 2007, Mr. Green wrote that his client was checking with the accountant 
to get a convenient time to meet, after April 17," which Mr. Green promised to "expedite." (R. 
00608, 00559.) 
e. Having heard nothing by the April 23rd, Mr. Taylor emailed both Ms. Taylor 
and the accountant numerous times trying to schedule a meeting, which was followed up by Ms. 
Schmid's request for Mr. Green's assistance. (R. 00607, 00555- 00558.) 
f. On May 17, 2007, Mr. Taylor again emailed the accountant trying to set up a 
meeting, which was followed up by a second letter from Ms. Schmid requesting Mr. Green's 
assistance. (R. 00607, 00553 - 00554.) This time, Ms. Schmid warned Mr. Green if a meeting 
was not scheduled by May 25, 2007, she intended to go forward with the hearing on the Second 
Motion to Compel. (R. 00607, 00553.) 
g. On May 22, 2007, Mr. Green wrote that whereas he had promised to facilitate the 
Mr. Taylor's meeting with the accountant, "it did not mean [he] would do Mr. Taylor's work for 
him or anyone else." (R.00551, 00606- 00607.) 
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17. At the June 11, 2007, hearing the Court ordered Mr. Green to provide a listing of 
what Ms. Taylor had provided and what was and was not available. ( R. 01062 -01063.) Ms. 
Taylor was ordered to produce anything that was available within 20 days. (R. 01062.) If Ms. 
Taylor had in her possession documents that were in the possession of the accountants, she was 
ordered to produce them or if not, Mr. Taylor would need to subpoena the documents from the 
accountants. (Id.) 
18. Also on June 11, 2007, the Court granted Ms. Taylor's request to deny Mr. Taylor 
overnights with the children based on concerns about his use of the sleep-aid Ambien. (R. 
01059.) Mr. Taylor initially objected to this recommendation but withdrew it based on the 
parties' agreement that Dr. Hale would perform an expedited visitation evaluation, with a 
particular emphasis on the issue of overnights. (R. 00625 - 00627, 00709- 710, 00724- 726.) 
19. On November 30, 2007, Mr. Taylor served his Notice of Deposition for Ms. 
Taylor, to take place January 15, 2008. (R. 00723.) 
20. On or about January 11, 2008, Ms. Schmid's assistant, Linda J. Harvill, spoke to 
Mr. Green about an Affidavit received from Ms. Taylor herself, which had been prepared and 
served without Mr. Green's knowledge. (R. 00790.) Mr. Green advised Ms. Harvill that she 
could ignore the Affidavit since no motion had been filed. (Id.) 
21. On January 11, 2008, two business days before her scheduled deposition, 
and almost a month and a half after the deposition notice was served, Ms. Taylor filed her 
Motion for Discovery Protective Order. (R. 00727- 00757.) Ms. Taylor argued the deposition 
should not proceed because (a) of the anticipated presence of attorney Russell Monahan. (R. 
00756 - 00757) and (b) Mr. Taylor had subpoenaed documents that he had not provided to her 
far enough in advance of the deposition so she would be familiar with them and not be surprised 
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by them. ( R. 00755-756.) Based on these objections, Ms. Taylor did not appear at her 
deposition on January 15,2007. 
22. On February 22, 2008, Mr. Taylor filed his opposition to the Discovery Protective 
Order, arguing that the Protective Order was brought in bad faith and simply as a stall tactic 
since (a) co- counsel of record are allowed to both attend a deposition and even so, Ms. Schmid 
had notified Mr. Green before the deposition that Mr. Monahan would not be attending; (R. 
00623-00624, 00779-00780, 00852, 00838); and (b) no court rule required that Ms. Taylor be 
provided with copies of all discovery received before her deposition could be taken or that she 
be provided with all documents far enough in advance of the deposition for her to review them. 
(R. 00778.) 
23. Also on February 20, 2008, Mr. Taylor filed his Third Motion to Compel 
(contained in a Countermotion) which sought production of the documents requested in Ms. 
Schmid's July 31, 2007, letter and as ordered by the Court on June 11, 2007. (R. 00793.) 
24. On April 9, 2008, Mr. Taylor filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause alleging 
that Ms. Taylor had violated the Order Following the Hearing on April 2, 2007, by, among other 
things, failing and refusing to attend divorce education class within 30 days as ordered by the 
court and exchange travel information two weeks in advance of traveling with the children. 
(R. 00904- 00907.) Mr. Taylor also asked the Court to (a) order Ms. Taylor to appeal* for her 
deposition, (b) enforce the time sharing recommendations of Dr. Valerie Hale, especially with 
respect to restoring his overnights; (R.00900 - 00903, 00906); (c) order Ms. Taylor to execute a 
release for bank records (R. 00906-00905.); and, (d) order Ms. Taylor to sign the IRS tax forms 
8821 and 8332. (Id) 
25. On April 14, 2008, Ms. Taylor argued in her opposition that (a) the request to 
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enforce Dr. Hale's recommendations was "unfair/' and "premature, " since "[i]t was never 
agreed and this Court has never ordered that Dr. Hale would prepare an expedited evaluation 
which would in any manner be entertained on a temporary basis, much less enforced..." (R. 
01028.) (b) she had attended divorce education class in April of 2007 (though no certificate of 
attendance was on file with the Court)( R. 01023.); and (c) whereas it was true she did not give 
Mr. Taylor two weeks advance notice of travel it was because she never planned her travel more 
than a few days in advance. (R. 1021) 
26. In his Verified Reply, Mr. Taylor once again described Ms. Taylor's continuing 
failures to adequately respond to discovery despite three Motions to Compel. (R. 01038 - 0142.) 
With respect to the deposition, Mr. Taylor pointed out if Ms. Taylor was allowed not to appear 
again based on the excuse of not having reviewed all the subpoenaed documents, she would 
never be deposed due to the large number of subpoenas Mr. Taylor had been forced to send 
because of Ms. Taylor's ongoing broken promises and refusal to produce her financial records. 
(R. 01038.) With respect to Dr. Hale's recommendations, Mr. Taylor reminded the Court he 
had withdrawn his objection to the Commissioner's recommendation, specifically in exchange 
for the parties' agreement that Dr. Hale perform an expedited evaluation with an emphasis on 
overnights. ( R. 01036.) Yet now that Dr. Hale had recommended restoring overnights and Mr. 
Taylor had been without overnights for over a year, ( R. 01036, 00900 - 00901), Ms. Taylor 
characterized his request as "premature." (R. 01027, 01036.) 
27. At the April 21, 2008, hearing, the Court ordered Ms. Taylor to (a) sign the bank 
releases and the IRS forms 8821 and 8332 (R. 01281 - 01283); (b)appear for a deposition within 
30 days and "[fjailure to produce subpoenaed documents shall not constitute an adequate basis to 
cancel the entire deposition...." (Id); and (c) to the extent she had not, to produce all 
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documents in her possession responsive to discovery requests. (Id.) The Court awarded Mr. 
Taylor overnights, reserving the remainder of Dr. Hale's time-sharing recommendations for an 
evidentiary hearing, and Mr. Taylor's request for attorney's fees and costs. (Id. ) Ms. Taylor's 
contempt was certified for failing to provide advance notice of travel and not attending divorce 
class. (Id.) 
28. On August 19, 2008, Mr. Taylor filed his Request for Evidentiary Hearing with 
respect to implementing the remaining terms of Dr. Valerie Hale's visitation evaluation. (R. 
01235.) The same day, Mr. Taylor filed his Second Motion for Order to Show Cause. (R01236, 
01237) based on Ms. Taylor's failure and refusal to (a) sign the bank releases and IRS forms as 
she was ordered to do in April, 2008. (R. 01236-01237.); and (b) sign Dr. Hale's contractual 
forms required to perform the custody/timesharing evaluation and pay half the fee, which she 
had been under an obligation to do since April, 2007. (Id.). 
29. On September 29, 2008, Judge Stephen J. Henriod scheduled an evidentiary 
hearing for October 20, 2008. (R. 01274.) On October 3, 2008, Ms. Taylor objected to the 
scheduling of Evidentiary Hearing of the grounds that "with minor exceptions" Dr. Hale's 
recommendations have been adopted. (R. 01278.) Ms. Taylor once again argued that "any trial 
of the parenting issues would be premature.... and unnecessarily 'heavy-handed.'." ( R 01276-
1277.) 
30. On October 16, 2008, Mr. Taylor was forced to move to continue the Evidentiary 
Hearing due to (a) Ms. Taylor's continuing failure and refusal to sign Dr. Hale's contractual 
forms, which had prevented the release of the written report; and (b) Mr. Green had moved to 
withdraw as Ms. Taylor's counsel. (R. 01299, 0310- 01311.) Mr. Taylor requested an award of 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with the Motion. (R. 01299.) 
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31. At the October 20, 2008, hearing, Judge Henriod allowed Mr. Green to withdraw. 
( R. 01323.) When Ms. Taylor, who indicated she would represent herself at the hearing, 
advised Judge Henriod he could not make her sign Dr. Hale's contracts, he ordered her to sign 
them in the courtroom before she left and gave her five minutes within which to do so. (R.02012 
- 02014, 02043 - 02044.) The Court stated further if Ms. Taylor did not sign the forms that day, 
"she would be taken into custody for contempt." (R. 01304.) 
32. On November 18,2008, Mary Corporon appeared as counsel of record for Ms. 
Taylor. (R. 01312-01313.) 
33. On February 4, 2009, Ms. Taylor moved to continue the already continued 
Evidentiary Hearing (which was to take place on February 6, 2009,) on the grounds that "the 
parties had been attempting to reach a resolution in the instant matter" and "a hearing [would] 
undermine a settlement discussion." (R. 01303, 01314-1315, 01347-01349.) Mr. Taylor denied 
the parties were engaged in settlement negotiations and noted that (a) the first settlement 
overture was sent on Friday, January 30, 2009, exactly one week before the evidentiary hearing 
and over three months since the Court scheduled it ( R. 01356- 01365, 01367-01368.); (b) the 
document prepared by Ms. Corporon, entitled "Partial Final Stipulation and Parenting Plan" 
deviated from Dr. Hale's written evaluation in significant respects (Id); (c) on February 3, 2009, 
Ms. Schmid faxed Ms. Corporon a letter indicating her settlement proposal was unacceptable 
and unless Ms. Taylor accepted Dr. Hale's recommendations " verbatim, and without 
qualifications," and paid $1,500 for her half of the written custody evaluation, along with Dr. 
Hale's fees, Mr. Taylor intended to go forward with the hearing. (R. 01353 - 01355, 01367.); 
(d) that despite having agreed back in July 31, 2008, that "Dr. Hale's recommendations would be 
adopted except as modified...." by the terms set forth in the letter, (R. 01351 - 01352, 01367.) 
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Ms. Taylor subsequently refused to sign the Stipulation reflecting the recommendations as 
modified, and then refused to sign a Stipulation containing Dr. Hale's recommendations, word 
for word, thus necessitating the evidentiary hearing (R. 01367); and (e) in the meantime, Ms. 
Taylor managed to delay the implementation of Dr. Hale's recommendations for almost a year 
by first leading Mr. Taylor to believe they had an agreement, and then by refusing to sign the 
contractual forms and pay one-half of the fee. (Id. ) While Judge Henriod denied Ms. Taylor's 
motion, the hearing had to be rescheduled for March 12, 2009. ( R. 01350, 1399- 01400.) 
34. On March 6, 2009, Ms. Taylor filed her Motion to Appoint Special Master. 
(R. 01391-01393.) 
35. At the evidentiary hearing on March 12, 2009, Ms. Corporon once again argued 
that the hearing was not necessary because the parties had stipulated to Dr. Hale's 
recommendations. (R. 01400.) Ms. Schmid once again disagreed and identified for the Court 
the disputed issues one by one. (Id.) As Ms. Schmid marched down the list, Dr. Hale testified 
regarding the basis for the recommendation and either Ms. Taylor decided she now agreed or the 
Court ruled, until all issues were resolved. (Id.) The Court appointed Brian Florence to serve as 
the Special Master, based on the parties' stipulation. (Id.) Additionally, Judge Henriod ordered 
Ms. Taylor to appear at a deposition on April 15, 2009, (which Mr. Taylor had been tiying to 
accomplish since June 19, 2006.) ( R. 01399.) Judge Henriod also ordered Ms. Taylor to sign 
the bank releases (which she had been ordered to do since April 21, 2008,) and to deliver them to 
Ms. Schmid no later than 5:00 p.m. the next day. (Id.) 
36. Ms. Corporon prepared the Partial Final Order Re: Custody and Parent Time. (R. 
01429 - 01432.) On April 6, 2009, Mr. Taylor filed his Objection to the Form of the Order, 
along with his proposed Partial Final Order Regarding Custody and Parent-Time. (R. 01417-
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01422.) Among many other problems, Ms. Taylor's proposed Partial Final Order omitted any 
reference to a land line for the children, which had been specifically ordered by the Court, and 
which Ms. Taylor had strenuously resisted from the beginning. (R. 01400, 01421).( Id.) 
37. On April 9, 2009, Craig Jacobsen appeared as co-counsel for Ms. Taylor, and 
shortly thereafter Ms. Corporon withdrew. (R. 01423-01424, 01433 - 01434.) 
38. On April 15, 2009, the day Ms. Taylor was court ordered to appear for her 
deposition, the parties settled the case instead. (R. 01498 - 01513.) Thereafter, Ms. Schmid 
prepared the Findings and Judgment and on April 23, 2009, filed a Notice to Submit for 
Decision. (R. 01527- 01528.) 
39. On April 27, 2009, Judge Henriod signed Mr. Taylor's proposed Partial Final 
Order Re: Custody and Parent-Time, and it was entered on April 28, 2009. (R. 01435 - 01442.) 
40. On May 11, 2009, Mr. Florence filed his Special Master Report and Order 
following a joint meeting with the parties on April 28, 2009. (R. 01443 - 01460.) The Report 
acknowledged the parties had signed the Special Master Agreement defining "the areas of 
authority delegated to [him] as well as the limits on that authority." (R. 01459, 01479 - 01474.) 
Mr. Florence entered various orders, including one requiring both parties to cooperate in getting 
their daughter a passport, which was based on the parties' agreement. ( R. 01446.) The Report 
concluded by advising the parties if either was dissatisfied with the decisions, "they are to file a 
motion to vacate or modify this Order with the Court within 20 days after this decision is mailed 
with a copy being served on the other." (R. 01444.) 
41. On May 27, 2009, Ms. Taylor filed her "Objection and Motion to Vacate Special 
Master Report and Order." (R. 01443- 01497.) Ms. Taylor first claimed the Special Master 
Report and Order was invalid because the Court had not entered the Order appointing Mr. 
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Florence before he assumed the role of Special Master. (R. 01496.) Ms. Taylor next argued 
that the Special Master Report and Order exceeded the scope of Mr. Florence's authority, and 
that his appointment, as defined, "constituted an improper delegation of judicial authority to a 
non-appointed judicial officer...." which violated "both the Utah Constitution and other 
applicable law." (R. 0 1465, 01496.) 
42. At a hearing on June 16, 2009, convened by Judge Henriod to address Ms. 
Schmid's objection to a letter sent directly to him by Mr. Jacobsen, (R. 01529- 01531), Judge 
Henriod rejected the parties' agreement regarding a fund for child support, and ordered the 
parties to exchange income information, modify the findings and judgment to reflect an accurate 
child support amount, and submit them to the Court by no later than July 10, 2009. (R.01564.) 
Because Ms. Taylor did not hand-deliver her Affidavit of Income until 4:52 p.m. on July 10, 
2009, it was impossible to comply with the Court's deadline. (R. 01670 - 01671.) 
43. On June 15, 2009, Ms. Taylor filed her Objection to the Notice to Submit and 
Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Entry. (R. 01532 - 01557.) She claimed she had 
just learned Mr. Taylor had lost his job, which she claimed was a material change of 
circumstances he failed to disclose, thus affecting both child support and insurance. (R. 01555.) 
She also claimed Mr. Taylor had not given notice of his intention to file the documents with the 
Court. (R. 01552.) 
44. On June 16, 2009, Mr. Taylor filed his Opposition to the Motion to Vacate 
Special Master Report and Order. (R. 01565 - 01568.) Mr. Taylor pointed out that: 
a. The Order appointing Mr. Florence was signed one day before the joint meeting 
with the parties and it was entered the same day of the meeting. (R. 01435 - 01442, 01567-
01568.) 
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b. The Special Master Agreement Ms. Taylor signed specifically gave Mr. Florence 
the broad right to make decisions involving the "implementation or clarification of existing 
orders concerning [the parties'] respective parenting rights, roles and obligations..." and most 
importantly, "[a]ny other area of parental conflict that directly or indirectly impacts the best 
interests of [the parties'] children....". (R. 01473, 01566.) 
c. Utah Rules of Alternative Dispute Resolution, Rule 102, provided Ms. Taylor 
with an appeal right, which she had just exercised. (R. 01565 - 01566.) 
45. On July 27, 2009, Judge Henriod issued a Minute Entry adopting the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment previously submitted by Ms. Schmid, with the 
exception of two paragraphs regarding the parties' income and the child support, which were to 
be altered consistent with the Minute Entry. (R. 01675 -1676.) On August 5, 2009, Ms. Schmid 
served the Amended Findings and Amended Judgment on Mr. Jacobsen. (R. 01733- 01754.) On 
August 7,2009, Judge Henriod denied Ms. Taylor's Motion to Vacate the Special Master Report 
and Order. (R. 01681 - 01682, 01731-01732.) Judge Henriod signed the Amended Findings 
and Amended Judgment on September 3,2009.( R. 01733 - 01743, 01744 -01754.) 
46. On October 9, 2009, Ms. Taylor, acting in pro se, even though Mr. Jacobsen had 
not withdrawn, filed her "Motion for Relief from Amended Order Dated August 24, 2009," 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b). (R. 01798 - 01801.) Ms. Taylor 
claimed the Amended Judgment changed many of the terms of the parties' Stipulation, 
which were never addressed or agreed to and there was no certificate of service so neither she 
nor her counsel saw the Amended Judgment before it was entered by the Court. (R. 01799 -
01800.) 
47. On October 13, 2009, Ms. Taylor filed her "Notice of Substitution of Counsel," 
17 
indicating she henceforth would represent herself. (R. 01802 - 01803.) Accompanying it was 
an "Affidavit in Support of Notice of Substitution of Counsel" (R. 1804 -1806.) which 
discussed settlement negotiations, the over one hundred thousand dollars in attorney's fees she 
had paid and her decision to no longer divert funds from her older children's tuition at private 
universities (over $40,000 each per year) by continuing to pay lawyers, thus necessitating self 
representation. ( R. 01805-1806.) The affidavit also included the statement that Mr. Taylor "has 
ample time on his hands to frustrate the conclusion of this case and may continue to do so." (R. 
01805.) 
48. On October 21, 2009, Ms. Taylor filed her "Motion to Continue or Cancel 
[the Commissioner] Hearing Scheduled for November 16, 2009." (R. 01828- 01830.) Ms. 
Taylor insisted that the ruling on her Objection to the Amended Judgment "take place first" and 
if the November 16, 2009, hearing on Mr. Taylor's Motion was rescheduled, she asked that it 
take place before Judge Henriod "to avoid confusion." (Id.) 
49. On October 28, 2009, Ms. Taylor filed her "Notice to Submit for Decision Re: 
Corrected Amended Judgment." (R. 01831 - 01877.) 
50. On November 4, 2009, Ms. Taylor filed her "Notice to Submit for Decision Re: 
Motion to move the hearing presently scheduled for the Commissioner on 11/16/2009 to Judge 
Henriod's Calendar." (R. 01878 - 01881.) The pleading contained the following comments: 
"[I] would forfeit the fifty dollars a month gladly to have this finally end, but it only reinforces 
[Mr. Taylor's propensity to be a bully and ignore or supercede any court decision that he dislikes 
by legal maneuvering. His counsel is ineffectual at reigning him in and exacerbates the situation 
by what she files on his behalf." (R. 01880.) 
51. On November 6, 2009, Mr. Taylor filed his Objection to Notice to Submit for 
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Decision and Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs. (R. 01883 - 01886.) Mr. Taylor argued 
that by choosing to represent herself, Ms. Taylor was responsible for reading, understanding and 
complying with the applicable statutes and court rules. (R. 01886.) He then pointed out the 
various procedural errors which mandated that her Notices to Submit be rejected, including Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 101, which required the Motions to be heard by the 
Commissioner. (R. 01884 - 01885.) He also objected to the "irrelevant, improper and 
unsubstantiated assertions contained in the Notice to Submit, which exceeded what should have 
been included under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(d)." (R. 01884.) Judge Henriod 
denied Ms. Taylor's Motion to Continue and ordered the hearing to remain before the 
Commissioner. (R. 01882.) 
52. On November 10, 2009, Ms. Taylor filed her "Motion to Show Cause Why 
Petitioner Has Not Paid Appropriate Child Support." (R. 01889- 01891.) In it, she asked the 
Court to "use its jurisdiction in enforcing the amount now due of $3,032." (R. 01891.) In 
support, Ms. Taylor stated that Mr. Taylor had refused to pay the $406 required by the 
Temporary Orders, was ordered to pay $352 per month on August 1, 2009, and had not paid it. 
(R. 1894-1895.) Ms. Taylor provided no accounting, did not specify for what months Mr. 
Taylor was delinquent, and did not mention child support payments he had made. ( R. 01889-
01891.) 
53. Also on November 10, 2009, Ms. Taylor filed her "Motion to Show Cause Re: 
Petitioner in Contempt of Parenting Agreement." (R. 01897 - 01898.) In it, she asked the Court 
to hold Mr. Taylor in contempt "for his actions on October 19, 2009." (R. 01898.) She also 
asked the Court "to use its jurisdiction in enforcing the no deviation policy as required per the 
Parenting Plan." (Id.) Ms. Taylor submitted an Affidavit in support (R. 01899-01901.) which 
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described how the parties' daughter was ill that day, and Mr. Taylor refused to return her to Ms. 
Taylor. (R. 01900 - 01901.) 
54. On November 11, 2009, Mr. Taylor filed his Opposition to Motion for Relief 
from Amended Order Dated August 24, 2009, and for Attorney's Fees and Costs." (R. 01902 -
01940.) Mr. Taylor argued that: 
a. Ms. Taylor received notice of the submission of the Amended Findings and 
Judgment on August 5, 2009, when Ms. Schmid served them on her then counsel, Mr. Jacobsen. 
(01902 - 01912, 01938.) Ms. Schmid included a notice reminding Ms. Jacobsen regarding the 
requirements of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(f)(2), and indicated her intention to 
submit the pleading to the Court after the time period had expired. (R. 1938, 01903.) Mr. 
Jacobsen filed no objection. (R. 01902 - 01912, 01938.) 
b. Ms. Taylor failed to identify the applicable grounds for relief under Rule 60(b). 
(R. 01937.) 
c. Ms. Taylor had simply looked at the wrong pleadings because the Amended 
Judgment signed and entered by the Court on September 3, 2009, contained terms consistent 
with the Stipulation and the Court's ruling on child support. (R. 01909, 01936.) 
55. At a hearing on November 16, 2009, Commissioner Evans rejected Ms. Taylor's 
attempt to have her various Motions addressed that day, on the grounds that she had not sent 
timely notice. (R. 01944.) The Court also clarified that the Amended Judgment signed by the 
Court on September 3, 2010, was the order of the Court. (R. 01944 - 01945.) That same day, 
Mr. Jacobsen withdrew as Ms. Taylor's counsel. (R. 01942 - 01943.) 
56. On December 28, 2009, Ms. Taylor filed her Notice of Hearing on "Respondent's 
Objection to the Amended Judgment," (R. 01946 - 01948.) 
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57. On January 11, 2010, Ms. Taylor filed her " Motion for Relief from Amended 
Judgment of September 3." (R. 01959 - 01964.) Ms. Taylor claimed Ms. Schmid had 
"unilaterally made changes to the settlement agreement that were not natural and logical 
extensions...." and she "disagree[d]." Ms. Taylor did not specify which changes she found 
unacceptable. (Id, ) Ms. Taylor's other complaint was Mr. Taylor was reducing his child 
support "by an amount that makes no sense...."and which he "should not be allowed to do." (R. 
01963.) 
58. Also on January 11, 2010, Ms. Taylor filed her Notice of Hearing on 
Respondent's Motion for Relief of the Amended Judgment of September 10, 2009"' for January 
25, 2010. (R. 01953 - 01955.) She indicated that the hearing on her "Motion for Relief of the 
Amended Judgment of August 24,2009," was "cancelled." (R. 01955.) The same day, Ms. 
Taylor filed her Notice of Hearing for "Respondent's Motion to Show Cause why the 
Respondent (sic) is not in Contempt for not paying Child Support" for January 25,2010. (R. 
01956-01958.) 
59. On January 15, 2010, Mr. Taylor filed his "Opposition to Respondent's Motion 
for Relief from Amended Judgment and Countermotion for Attorney's Fees and Costs." (R. 
01965 - 01970.) Mr. Taylor argued: 
a. Ms. Taylor has once again failed to articulate any grounds justifying relief from 
the Amended Judgment under Rule 60(b), other than that she "disagrees" which did not suffice. 
(R. 01967.) 
b. Even had Ms. Taylor articulated proper grounds, her Motion was untimely 
because it was not filed within 90 days of September 3, 2010, as required by Rule 60(b). (Id.) 
c. The Amended Findings and Amended Judgment were served on her counsel of 
21 
record at the time, who filed no objection. (R. 01966.) 
d. If Ms. Taylor had read the rules, Mr. Taylor would not have to waste attorney's 
fees and costs responding to a baseless motion. {Id ) Mr. Taylor argued that "[bjecause Ms. 
Taylor is not paying her own attorney, she has no incentive to do anything differently, and files 
whatever she wants, whenever she wants, because she knows if she loses, it costs Petitioner 
dearly and her nothing and " [i]f Respondent is permitted to hide behind her ignorance of the 
law and drag Petitioner back to Court every time something happens with which she 'disagrees,' 
this will create an unreasonable expense and burden on the Court, as well as the Petitioner." (R. 
01965-01966.) 
60. On January 15, 2010, Mr. Taylor filed his Opposition to Ms. Taylor's Motion 
regarding child support and request for attorney's fees. (R. 01971 - 02002.) Mr. Taylor 
explained: 
b. On September 4, 2009, Mr. Taylor filed a Rule 59 motion to amend with respect 
to the child support amount, which motion was denied on November 16, 2009. (Id) After the 
hearing, Ms. Schmid emailed the Special Master and indicated that in light of the denial of the 
motion, Mr. Taylor understood he owed $406 per month for May, June and July and $352 for 
August, September, October and November, for a total of $2,626. (R. 01994 - 01995, 02000 -
02001.) 
b. On November 21, 2009, Mr. Taylor provided Ms. Taylor with a written 
reconciliation of the arrearage, less Ms. Taylor's share of the children's health insurance 
premiums, with credit for child support payments he had made, and indicated he would be 
sending the balance of $1,255 to Ms. Taylor that week. (R. 01992 - 01993, 02000.) 
c. On November 23, 2009, Ms. Taylor questioned the amount, instructed Mr. 
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Taylor to stop payment on the child support checks he had sent and to not send the check for 
$1,255. (Id.) That same day, Ms. Schmid explained to Ms. Taylor that the discrepancy between 
the amounts was her number did not reflect deductions for Ms. Taylor's one-half share of the 
children's medical insurance premiums. (R. 01974 , 02000.) Nevertheless, that same day, Ms. 
Taylor opened a case with the Office of Recovery Services. (R. 01991 - 01992, 02000.) 
d. On December 23, 2009, Mr. Taylor sent the ORS a check for $1,088, which 
covered four months of child support, less the $80 per month for Ms. Taylor's one-half share of 
the children's medical insurance premiums, which once automatic withholding began, would 
bring Mr. Taylor current, according to the ORS, by the end of January. (R. 01975- 01978, 
01999.) 
e. On January 6, 2010, Ms. Taylor acknowledged Mr. Taylor had paid her child 
support totaling $885. (R. 01974, 01999.) When Ms. Taylor inquired about settling the matter 
out of court, Ms. Schmid advised her that now that Ms. Taylor had turned over the matter to the 
ORS, the ORS would now be responsible for determining what was owed. (R. 01999, 01973.) 
61. On January 15, 2010, Mr. Taylor filed his Countermotion (R. 02003 -
02005.) asking the Court: 
a. To order Ms. Taylor to provide a facsimile number where she could be 
served with pleadings or to order Ms. Taylor to provide a physical address where she could be 
served by hand delivery. ( R. 02005.) 
b. To order Ms. Taylor to cooperate in obtaining a passport for the parties' 
daughter, as required in the Special Master Report and Order, filed May 11, 2009. (R. 02004.) 
c. To hold Ms. Taylor in contempt of Court for failing and refusing to 
comply with the Special Master Report and Order that she cooperate in obtaining the daughter's 
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passport and for failing and refusing to pay Mr. Taylor the sum of $41,000, on or before January 
1, 2010, and to award Mr. Taylor his attorney's fees and costs. (Id.) 
62. In support of his Countermotion, Mr. Taylor alleged: 
a. He tried to arrange to meet Ms. Taylor to fill out the passport forms numerous 
times from April to October 2009, but she refused to cooperate. (R. 02042 - 02045.) On July 
13, 2009, she cancelled because "circumstances had changed with his employment" and her 
belief that "a passport will be a breeding ground for further disagreement about where it is 
appropriate to take the children and for how long." (R. 02014 - 02015, 02044.) 
b. When Mr. Taylor requested the Special Master's assistance, Ms. Taylor 
advised Mr. Florence that" after considerable research on the topic, it is doubtful that a 
parent...can be court ordered to give consent to have a passport made for a (sic) minor children 
this age. (Ms. Taylor made the same argument, to wit, that Judge Henriod could not make her 
sign Dr. Valerie Hale's contract forms at a hearing on December 1, 2008.) (R. 02012 - 02014, 
02043 - 02044.) On July 19, 2009, Mr. Florence indicated he disagreed with Ms. Taylor's 
analysis but that he had issued his order, and she had not objected. ( R. 02012, 02043.) 
c. On July 19, 2009, in response to Mr. Taylor's request to meet for the passports, . 
Ms. Taylor indicated her belief that a court could order a parent to get a passport only if it were 
in the children's best interests. (R. 02011-02012, 02042 - 02043.) After the Court rejected Ms. 
Taylor's Objection to the Special Master's Report and Order, Mr. Taylor tried again to schedule 
a time to get the passport, Ms. Taylor emailed Mr. Florence and argued that since Mr. Taylor has 
retired "there was nothing compelling his presence in the US;" it is evident from reviewing the 
calendars that "neither parent has a very long expanse of time to even be out of the country;" and 
Mr Taylor did not return the children on time following a trip to Yellowstone and " [i]f we 
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expound on the potential for complications for an overseas trip, the passport scenario is fraught 
with problems." ( R. 02008.) Moreover, Ms. Taylor stated that" [t]he State Department requires 
that both parents agree on whether the children should have a passport. I feel the issue of 
overriding parental consent falls outside the realm of the Special Master and ask you to defer the 
issue of over riding a parental consent to a Legislative Body now that you better understand my 
objections which we did not have time to even gather at our initial meeting. (R. 02008- 02009, 
02042.) The purpose of the email was "to present the fact that I feel that I complied with your 
original request to cooperate and ask you to please acknowledge that I did." 
( R. 02008, 02042.) ( Emphasis in the original.) 
63. In her Affidavit in support of the Countermotion, Ms. Schmid: 
a. described her difficulties in serving Ms. Taylor given the large volume of 
motions Ms. Taylor had filed and Ms. Taylor's refusal to provide a physical address where she 
could be served by hand. (R. 02054.) One of the attached emails acknowledged the receipt of 
six emails from Ms. Taylor in one day (R. 02050.); and 
b. attached an email from Ms. Taylor responding to an inquiry about when Ms. 
Taylor intended to pay the $41,000 to Mr. Taylor, which stated: "[t]he payment that is 'due' (lol) 
Paul from business is going to be paid at the closing for the sale of that business. That will occur 
Friday or shortly thereafter." ( R. 02053-02054, 02047.) 
64. On January 19, 2010, Ms. Taylor filed her Withdrawal of Motion for Relief of 
Amended Judgment." ( R. 02056 - 2058.) In it, she explained that while " the settlement was 
unfortunately and unexplainably (sic) altered unilaterally by [Mr. Taylor] and [Ms. Schmid] 
when it was submitted to the court...[she] must again pursue a course that is in the best interest of 
my family to minimize conflicts and court time with [Mr. Taylor.]" (R. 02058.) She also 
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requested affirmative relief" that the court will not assign the writing of any future orders to 
[Mr. Taylor.]95 (Id.) 
65. Also on January 19, 2010, Ms. Taylor filed her objection to the Countermotion 
(R. 02059 - 02061.) Ms. Taylor argued that "[u]nder Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 101 
(g) a counter motion may be filed by a responding party but must oppose the Respondent's 
previously noticed motion to grant relief to the responding party." (R. 02061.) Ms. Taylor 
contended that the countermotion did not meet that criteria because "[i]t has nothing to do with 
the Motion to Show Cause why the Petitioner is not in contempt for not paying child support in a 
responsible and timely manner." (Id. ) She further accused the Mr. Taylor of "trying to muddy 
the waters regarding his recalcitrance by making unrelated accusations about the Respondents 
(sic) that are not responsive as required by a Countermotion." (Id.) 
66. Also on January 19, 2010, Ms. Taylor filed her "Objection to Request for 
Attorney Fees." (R. 2062 - 02064.) She argued that she tried to work out the outstanding child 
support issue out of court but "[Ms. Schmid] ignored these attempts and did not want to do that." 
(R. 02064.) 
67. Also on January 19, 2010, Petitioner filed her "Emergency Request for a 
Restraining Order." (R. 02065 - 02072.) Per Ms. Taylor, the purpose of the emergency request 
was "to ease the strained relations between [Ms. Schmid], [Mr. Taylor] and [herself] and to 
further clarify rules of conduct which will help these parties identify correct, non threatening and 
non offensive behaviors towards the other parties...." (R. 02072.) She asked the Court to order: 
a. "As previously ordered," that the parties be mutually restrained from personal 
contact and communicate with each other only by mail or email except in emergencies. (Id.) 
b. "At the request of Gayanne K. Schmid, [she] and [Ms. Taylor] be restrained 
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from any type of telephone contact." except in emergencies. (R. 02067, 02071.) That Ms. 
Schmid be ordered that in the case of an emergency, she was not to "instruct her staff "to hang 
up when you hear her voice" with respect to [Ms. Taylor.] (R. 02071.) 
c. Ms. Schmid be restrained from telling messengers to hand-deliver pleadings 
to anyone who answers the door at Ms. Taylor's home because "[i]t would be improper for the 
"messenger" to hand papers to the minor children who are 7 and 9, if they answer the door." 
(id.) 
d. Ms. Schmid and Mr. Taylor be restrained from "saying any untruth or 
exaggeration about [Ms. Taylor] in open court in Tooele and vice versa." (Id. ) 
e. The parties be restrained from coming to each other's residences or place 
of business when the other party is not at home. (Id.) 
f. Mr. Taylor be restrained from calling Ms. Taylor's land line to "check and 
see if anyone is home." (Id ) 
g. The parties observe curbside pick up and drop off of the children. (Id.) 
The Emergency Request was not accompanied by a Motion requesting a shortened briefing 
schedule nor did Ms. Taylor provide a Memorandum or Affidavit containing any facts 
supporting Ms. Taylor's requests or identifying the nature of the emergency. (R. 02065 -
02072.) 
68. On January 20, 2010, Ms. Taylor filed her Notice of Hearing on the Emergency 
Request for Restraining Order, to be heard January 25, 2010, at 1:30 p.m. (R. 02073 - 02075.) 
69. At the January 25, 2010, hearing: 
a. Ms. Taylor, representing herself, conceded she was not asking the Court to do 
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anything about the child support issue because she believed it was going to be taken care of by 
the Office of Recovery Services. (R. 02086, page 4.) Ms. Taylor then argued she should not 
have to pay Mr. Taylor's attorney's fees associated with the Motion because she tried to settle 
the matter out of court. (R. 02086, page 3.) 
b. When Judge Henriod asked Ms. Taylor directly, "You still owe him $41,000?" 
(Id.) Ms. Taylor replied, "Yes, sir, I do " (Id. ) Ms. Taylor explained the money was to come 
from the proceeds from the sale of her business and she had asked Ms. Schmid to review a 
release of claims. (R. 02086, page 5 - 6.) When Judge Henriod asked "When was the decree or 
order that ordered you to pay it? How long has it been?" (Id.) Ms. Taylor replied, " It ordered 
me to pay it January 1, 2010." (Id. ) 
c. With respect to the $41,000 payment, Ms. Schmid indicated she had agreed to 
review the release but Ms. Taylor had never provided it, along with any information about the 
sale - no closing schedule, no documents indicating the business was for sale, has sold, will be 
selling. (R. 02086, pages 13-14.) Ms. Schmid complained Ms. Taylor had filed four motions in 
the past two-and- a half months, one of them regarding visitation that should properly be 
considered by the Special Master and/or mediated. (R. 02086, page 6 -7.) Ms. Schmid 
recounted how Ms. Taylor had withdrawn her motion for relief under Rule 60(b), at the last 
minute, which had she read the rules, she never would have filed, filed a motion regarding child 
support after she and rejected Mr. Taylor's payments and turned the matter over to the ORS, and 
that her emergency motion was untimely. (Id.) Ms. Schmid then described how that Ms. 
Taylor refused to comply with the terms of the Amended Judgment and the Special Master's 
Orders, did not read or comply with the court rules, played games with service of process, called 
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Ms. Schmid's office constantly, misrepresented their discussion to the Court and then threatened 
to send her to the Utah State Bar, or, when Ms. Schmid refused the calls, Ms. Taylor barraged 
her with emails, as many as six times per day, and if Ms. Schmid did not respond right away, she 
again threatened to send her to the Utah State Bar. (R. 02086, page 8.) Ms. Schmid argued that 
Ms. Taylor " files whatever she wants, whenever she wants, and she doesn't care about 
corresponding with the law. It costs her nothing. Even if you today, your Honor, deny each and 
every one of her baseless, untimely motions, like I expect you will, my client's still out. He's 
had to pay me to oppose all this. He's had to pay me to come and argue this and to answer her 
five and six emails, and to tell her I won't take her phone calls." (Id.) Ms. Schmid stated that 
"[t]he only deterrent is fees and costs, although she makes $40,000 per month. So maybe even 
jail time is the only way to do it, because as you recall, your Honor, you almost had to throw her 
in jail just to get her to sign Val Hale's standard contract forms, and that is what I've been going 
through, the same thing all over again." {Id.) 
d. With respect to the child support, Ms. Schmid described how the parties did not 
have a final child support number until November, 2009, and that thereafter, Mr. Taylor tried to 
send Ms. Taylor a check for the balance but she ordered him not to send it and to stop payment 
on previous checks, after which she turned the case over to the ORS. (R. 02086, page 10. ) 
Ms. Schmid described how Ms. Taylor then tried to negotiate the child support arrearage and 
when Ms. Schmid advised her the ORS now had to handle it because she had opened a case, Ms. 
Taylor accused her of acting in bad faith, threatened to send her to the state bar and now argued 
she should not have to pay Mr. Taylor's attorney's fees because she tried to settle. (Id.) 
e. Also with respect to the ORS, Ms. Schmid described how Ms. Taylor insisted that 
29 
Mr. Taylor not be allowed to deduct her share of the children's health insurance premiums from 
the child support, even though it is in the Amended Judgment, and when the ORS asked her 
about it, she advised them she had filed a motion to change that provision. (R. 02086, page 10-
11.) Even after the ORS told Ms. Taylor premiums were going to be deducted, Ms. Taylor 
noticed the Motion up for a hearing anyway. (R. 02086, page 11.) 
f. As for Ms. Taylor's Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the Amended Judgment, Ms. 
Schmid argued that Ms. Taylor recited no grounds (other than she disagreed with some of the 
terms), her attorney had received the papers as required by the court rules, did not object, the 
Court signed it, and her motion was untimely. (Id.) 
g. With respect to Ms. Taylor's emergency motion, Ms. Schmid argued it was 
untimely and certainly not an emergency, since much of the relief requested was already court 
ordered. (R. 02086, page 12.) 
h. Ms. Schmid requested that Ms. Taylor be restrained from calling her office, and 
that she provide a physical address where she could be served, since she refused to give one, 
would not accept faxes, and did not want papers left at her residence. (Id. ) 
i. With respect to the passports, Ms Schmid recited how Ms. Taylor initially agreed 
to get the daughter a passport, showed up at the passport office once, but the parties did not have 
proper paperwork. She then changed her mind , advised the Special Master he couldn't make her 
get the child a passport, expressed her belief that no court could make her get the child a 
passport, and finally asked the Special Master to defer the issue to a legislative body. (R. 02086, 
pages 15-16.) 
70. At the conclusion of the January 25, 2010, hearing, Judge Henriod granted Mr. 
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Taylor's Countermotion with respect to the passports and ordered Ms. Taylor to get her daughter 
a passport within five days. (R. 02129, 02077, 02086, page 26.) The Court also found Ms. 
Taylor in contempt of Court for failing to pay the $41,000 when due. (R. 02129, 02076- 02077, 
02086, pages 26, 27.) The Court sentenced her to 30 days in jail, plus a $1,000 fine but allowed 
her to purge her contempt by getting the passport done within five days and paying the $41,000 
within 24 hours. ( R. 02129, 02076, 02086, pages 26, 27.) The Court also awarded Mr. Taylor 
his attorney's fees and costs. (Id. ) The Court stated: "The reason for the fees and costs, in 
addition to the fact that Ms. Taylor is in violation of court orders, is that you intentionally engage 
in a course of conduct to make dealings with you all but impossible. I have observed this 
personally over the time that's been in court. This includes constantly changing counsel, 
representing yourself and putting the other party in a position where he has to pay legal fees for 
emails and telephone calls and other matters that are a complete waste of time." (R. 02129, 
02086, page 26- 27.) The Court charged Ms. Schmid with the responsibility of reporting 
compliance and warned Ms. Taylor "[i]f I hear that that hasn't happened, I'll be issuing a bench 
warrant for your arrest. Do you understand Ms Taylor?" (R. 02076, 02086, page 27.) Ms. 
Taylor responded, " Could I just clarify? You're ordering me to get - as the Court - or officer of 
the Court to get a passport for Rachel? (Id. ) The Court replied, "Yes." (Id. ) Ms. Taylor said, 
"Even if I am not giving my consent?"( Id.) The Court replied " Absolutely." (Id. ) 
71. On February 5, 2010, Mr. Taylor filed the "Schmid Affidavit Regarding 
Compliance with Court's Order Issued January 25, 2010." (R. 02087 - 02096.) In it, Ms. Schmid 
recounted: 
a. The afternoon of January 26, 2010, Ms. Schmid received an email and facsimile 
31 
from Ms. Taylor's accountant indicating a check for $41,000 would be ready at his office by 
4:30 p.m. that afternoon (30 minutes past the deadline) which Mr. Taylor would have to pick up. 
(R. 02089 - 02092, 02095.) He also indicated they "had been instructed that the Release of 
Claim must be signed by Mr. Taylor at the time he stops in, prior to us providing him with the 
funds. (Id.) 
b. Ms. Schmid responded at 5:08 p.m. and advised Ms. Taylor's accountant that Ms. 
Taylor was obligated to pay the money to Mr. Taylor within 24 hours and there were no 
preconditions, such him picking it up or signing the release. (R.02087 - 02088, 02095.) Ms. 
Schmid further advised him that because Ms. Taylor had not done so within 24 hours, she was in 
contempt of court. (Id.) Ms. Schmid indicated Ms. Taylor needed to have the check to Ms. 
Schmid's office by 9:00 a.m. the next day and leave it whether or not Mr. Taylor signed the 
release, or she would contact the Court and have a bench warrant issued for Ms. Taylor's arrest. 
(R. 02087 - 02088, 02094.) The check was there early the next morning. (R. 02086.) 
72. On February 8, 2010, Ms. Taylor filed her "Objection to the Notice of Review 
Hearing and Request for Continuance." (R. 02102 - 02107.) Ms. Taylor relied on UCJP 
(Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Rule 47), which she claimed governed review hearings in 
this matter, wherein the moving party was required to inform the non-moving party of the facts 
warranting a review hearing, which she claimed had not occurred. (R. 02106 - 02107.) 
73. Also on February 8, 2010, Ms. Taylor filed her "Objection to the Form of the 
"Order Following the Hearing on January 25." (R. 02108 - 02110.) She stated that "[consistent 
with the Petitioner's previous objections to the Respondent, the format of the Order should 
separate the Facts, Findings and Orders." (R. 02110.) Ms. Taylor did not cite any law 
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supporting her Objection. (R. 02108 -02110.) 
74. Also on February 8, 2010, Ms. Taylor filed the "Affidavit of Respondent with 
Respect to Passports." ( R. 02111 - 02113.) The Affidavit was not signed, notarized or even 
served on Ms. Schmid. (Id. ) Ms. Taylor explained that her opposition to the passports was not 
baseless, but based on "significant events described herein but moreover from her association 
with [Mr. Taylor] over the course often years." (R. 02113.) She indicated she did not wish to 
disparage Mr. Taylor, but "knows of his propensity towards volatile/or violent behavior in 
stressful situations." (Id.) Ms. Taylor indicated her feeling that" overseas travel may prove 
stressful for him and/or their minor children.... and is not in their best interests." {Id.) Ms. 
Taylor then made a series of unsubstantiated allegations about Mr. Taylor, including references 
to events of "violence toward a minor child when Petitioner was upset, as set forth in Exhibit A," 
which Ms. Taylor did not attach to the Affidavit. (R. 02111 - 02113.) She indicated that while 
she recognized that the Court had given Mr. Taylor the right to get the children passports, and 
that she would cooperate, she "cannot and under Federal Passport Law, does not need to give 
consent by signature." ( R. 02112.) 
75. At the review hearing on February 8,2010, the Court asked Ms. Taylor if it was 
true that she had failed to get the $41,000 paid according to the time frame in which it was to be 
paid and that she undid the signing of the child's passport by writing "under duress" under her 
signature. ( R. 02118, page 2.) Ms. Taylor claimed she "had the $41,000 ready within 24 
hours" but did not know Mr. Taylor would not pick it up. (R. 02118, page 3.) Ms. Taylor said 
she tried to drop it off at Mr. Taylor's home that night but he was not there. (Id.) Ms. Taylor 
admitted she dropped the check off the next morning at Ms. Schmid's office. (Id.) With respect 
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to the passport, Ms. Taylor explained that under federal law, only one parent needs to give 
consent to a passport if there is a court order in place and all that needs to be attached to the 
application is a document stating that there is a court order in place. (Id.) When the Court asked 
Ms. Taylor if she had signed the application "under duress," Ms. Taylor replied "Yes, I did." ( 
Id. ) The Court found Ms. Taylor in contempt of Court to serve 30 days in jail and pay a $1,000 
fine, forthwith." (R. 02118, page 4.) 
76. On February 10, 2010, Mr. Taylor filed his Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and 
Costs, seeking an award of $3,607.29. (R. 02097 - 02101.) 
77. On February 18, 2010, Bart J. Johnsen appeared as counsel for Ms. Taylor. (R. 
02122-02123.) 
78. On March 15, 2010, the Court signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Order Following Hearing on February 8, 2010. (R. 02131 - 02138.) The Findings 
recited the Ms. Taylor's long history, as detailed above, justifying the awarded sanctions. 
79. On or about April 7, 2010, Mr. Taylor filed his Amended Affidavit of Attorney's 
Fees and Costs, seeking an award of $5,213.39 (R. 02157- 02162.) On April 9, 2010, the Court 
signed the Supplemental Order Following Hearing on January 25, 2010, awarding Mr. Taylor 
attorney's fees and costs of $3,607.29. (R. 02163 - 02165.) On October 26, 2010, the Court 
signed and entered the Amended Supplemental Order Following Hearing on January 25, 2010, 
awarding Mr. Taylor attorney's fees and costs of $5,213.39. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Ms. Taylor failed to marshal the evidence, requiring the dismissal of her appeal. 
2. Because Ms. Taylor has already served her jail time, and other than the 
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appropriateness of the financial sanctions, the issue of contempt is moot. The issue should be 
dismissed. 
3. Ms. Taylor has waived her right to challenge the adequacy of the findings on 
appeal because she did not preserve the issue in the lower court as required by law. 
4. Even if the requisite findings were not explicitly articulated, the record is clear 
and the failure to make specific findings is harmless error. 
5. With respect to the substance of her appeal, Ms. Taylor admits the facts necessary 
for the court to find her in contempt; it is within the court's discretion to determine the 
conditions for a successful purging of contempt and Ms. Taylor failed to do so; and the statutes 
support an award of attorneys fees in addition to fine and imprisonment for contempt. 
6. Mr. Taylor is entitled to an award of his attorneys fees and costs on appeal 
because she prevailed below. 
ARGUMENT I 
MS. TAYLOR FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
Ms. Taylor's appeal focuses on two actions on her pan; to wit, her failure to pay Mr. 
Taylor $41,000 on a timely basis and her signing the child's passport application, but then 
denoting her signature was made "under duress." Ms. Taylor has admitted these actions. 
However, as Judge Henriod made abundantly clear, the sanctions were not imposed in a 
vacuum. They were imposed in full recognition of Ms. Taylor's lengthy and torturous history of 
engaging in conduct that was inappropriate, defiant, obstinate, and dilatory, which cost Mr. 
Taylor excessive and unnecessary attorney's fees and which constituted a burden on the court. 
It is that evidence Ms. Taylor was required to marshal in order for this court to determine 
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whether the evidence was legally insufficient to support the order of contempt. 
Both the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court have exhaustively defined 
the requirements to marshal the evidence on appeal. For example, recently, in the case of Chen 
v. Steward, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004), the Utah Supreme Court stated that: 
Unfortunately, as is manifest by the defendants' failure to marshal 
the evidence in the present case, the requirement of marshaling 
still does not appear to be understood with the sense of clarity 
and urgency we desire. As a result of this lack of understanding, 
and the fact that defendants' failure to marshal in this case proves 
virtually fatal to their claims, we take the opportunity to reiterate 
the requirements of marshaling. 
* * * 
In order to challenge a court's factual findings, 'an appellant must 
first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court 
below.' 
Id. at 1195-96. (citations omitted.) 
The Utah Supreme Court went on to cite a case heard by the Utah Court of Appeals, 
adding that "in order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger 
must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." Id. at 1196. (citing 
Neelev v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724 (Utah Ct. App. 2002.) The Court concluded: 
The process of marshaling is thus fundamentally different 
from that of presenting the evidence at trial. The 
challenging party must 'temporarily remove its own prejudices 
and fully embrace the adversary's position'; he or she 
must play the 'devil's advocate'.... Appellants cannot merely 
present carefully selected facts and excerpts from the record 
in support of their position. 
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Id. (citing Harding v. Bell 57 P.3d 1093 (Utah 2002). (Other citations omitted.) 
Applying this standard to Ms. Taylor's brief, she has presented no facts supporting the 
finding of contempt she resists and has provided nothing that "embraces" Judge Henriod's 
ruling. Had she done so, Mr. Taylor would not have been required to chronicle the 
excruciatingly long and detailed history of Ms. Taylor's obstreperous conduct in this matter, 
culminating in her incarceration. Ms. Taylor would have this Court believe she was thrown in 
jail for missing a payment deadline by only a few hours, despite her best efforts, and for writing 
something on the passport application that she assured Judge Henriod would make no difference. 
Yet Ms. Taylor's textbook failure to present anything other than "carefully selected facts and 
excerpts from the record" defeats her appeal. By way of summary: 
A. Mr. Taylor was forced to file three motions to compel, beginning in 
March, 2006, and continuing over the course of several years, yet in the end, he 
never received the discovery he sought. The first time Ms. Taylor refused to 
comply with discovery, the Court defaulted her and she had to move to set aside. 
The Court relented but awarded Mr. Taylor his fees. Ms. Taylor delayed the 
scheduling of a hearing on the second motion to compel (with respect to the same 
discovery requests) for eight months, based on repeated promises, beginning in 
October, 2006, that she would make her financial records available in her 
accountant's office. Ms. Taylor then withheld written permission, made 
numerous requests to postpone scheduled meetings, broke promises to "expedite" 
until finally, in June 2007, and a hearing, Mr. Taylor was forced to subpoena the 
records. Also on the discovery front, it took two court orders and two motions for 
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orders to show cause, beginning in April, 2008, and finally ending in March, 
2009, just to get Ms. Taylor to sign the bank releases, and then only after Judge 
Henriod imposed a 24 deadline. 
B. After Ms. Taylor ignored requests to schedule her deposition in June, 
2006, and April, 2007, Mr. Taylor's counsel noticed it up for January, 2008. Ms. 
Taylor waited a month and a half, until just two days before the hearing, to file a 
protective order and then failed to appear, relying on the baseless excuses that two 
co-counsel in the case were going to attend and she had not been supplied with all 
the subpoenaed documents in advance. In April, 2008, after Mr. Taylor filed a 
motion to compel her attendance, the Court ordered a deposition within 30 days 
and specifically forbade Ms. Taylor from relying on the excuse that she had not 
been provided all the documents. Yet, it took almost a year, and yet another court 
hearing in March 12, 2009, to finally compel Ms. Taylor to appear, and then only 
after Judge Henriod ordered her to appear on April 15, 2009. 
C. After Mr. Taylor withdrew his objection to the temporary restraint 
against overnights with the children because Ms. Taylor agreed to an expedited 
visitation evaluation, with an emphasis on overnights, and Dr. Hale recommended 
that overnights be restored, Ms. Taylor fought implementation tooth and nail. Ms. 
Taylor argued that the request was "premature," even though Mr. Taylor had been 
without overnights for more than a year. It took two months and a hotly contested 
hearing to restore the overnights. It took over nine months and an evidentiary 
hearing to implement the remainder of Dr. Hale's recommendations because Ms. 
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Taylor first agreed to abide by Dr. Hale's recommendations, with a few changes 
to which Mr. Taylor agreed, and then when presented with a series of stipulations 
memorializing the agreement and her changes, she refused to sign. Then, when 
Mr. Taylor finally gave up and requested an evidentiary hearing, Ms. Taylor 
fought that too - incredibly claiming that it was unnecessary because the parties 
had settled. Next, Ms. Taylor forced the continuance of the evidentiary hearing 
by refusing to sign Dr. Hale's contract forms (which she had been under an 
obligation to have signed since April, 2007), and by not paying half the fee. At 
the hearing, Ms. Taylor advised Judge Henriod he could not make her sign the 
forms. She signed them only after Judge Henriod gave her five minutes to do so 
and threatened her with jail if she did not. Ms. Taylor's next tactic to delay the 
rescheduled evidentiary hearing was to circulate a last minute settlement offer, 
and then move to cancel the rescheduled evidentiary hearing on the grounds that 
it would impede settlement negotiations. When that proved unsuccessful, Ms. 
Taylor continued to make the same argument at the rescheduled hearing, until she 
was confronted with all the ways in which her proposed settlement deviated from 
Dr. Hale's recommendations. Even then, after Judge Henriod had ruled, Ms. 
Taylor submitted a proposed order which left out certain terms Ms. Taylor still 
strenuously objected to, in defiance of the Court's order. 
D. It was Ms. Taylor's motion to appoint a special master and yet 
when Mr. Florence made decisions she opposed after their very first meeting, Ms. 
Taylor challenged his authority and tried to have his report and order vacated "as 
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an improper delegation of judicial authority to a nonjudicial officer." With 
respect to getting the child's passport, Ms. Taylor originally agreed to have it 
issued, and participated in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain one. Ms. Taylor then 
changed her mind, after concocting an ever-increasing list of baseless reasons, 
such as the parties have no relatives overseas. When Mr. Taylor asked Mr. 
Florence to enforce his order, Ms. Taylor advised him no court could order her to 
sign for the passport. Ms. Taylor requested that Mr. Florence "defer the issue of 
overriding parental consent to a legislative authority..." because it was "outside 
his realm as special master,"and then asked him to find that she had complied 
with his order. Through these machinations, Ms. Taylor managed to delay the 
child's passport from April, 2009, until the end of January, 2010, and when 
ordered to get the passport within 5 days, she flaunted the Court's order by 
attempting to sabotage the issuance of the passport by writing "signed under 
duress," underneath her signature. Ms. Taylor then tried to justify her 
disobedience by rearguing her rationale against getting the passport issued in an 
affidavit she did not bother to serve on opposing counsel, and in court, explaining 
to Judge Henriod that "federal law" did not require both parents' signatures for 
the issuance of a passport anyway. 
E. Beginning in April, 2009, and continuing until January, 2010, Ms. 
Taylor challenged each and every version of the uncontested documents prepared 
in this matter. She first disputed the Findings and Judgment prepared after the 
Stipulation was signed in April 2009. She then challenged the Amended Findings 
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and Judgment, twice; the first time because she read the one dated August 24, 
2010, which was the wrong one, and the second time because she disagreed. 
With respect to the last challenge, Ms. Taylor did not comply with any of the 
requirements of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b), including that she file 
within 90 days and that she state applicable grounds. 
F. Ms. Taylor retained six attorneys over the course of this action and 
periodically represented herself. She prepared and filed her own answer when 
she was represented by Ms. McKonkie, filed a rogue Affidavit when she was 
represented by Mr. Green, and filed numerous motions when Mr. Jacobsen was 
still her attorney of record. When Ms. Taylor represented herself, she filed 
motions that were untimely, prohibited by the rules, and/or unsupported by the 
law, and when called on it, would try to hide behind the fact that she was not an 
attorney. 
G. After she once again started representing herself in October 2009, 
Ms. Taylor papered the Court and Ms. Schmid with multiple motions and 
pleadings of uncertain kind and nature. She attempted to cultivate the Court's 
sympathy by filing an unnecessary affidavit supporting her notice of substitution 
of counsel which contained settlement terms in violation of Utah Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 408 and disparaging comments about Mr. Taylor and which 
described the over one hundred thousand in attorney's fees she had paid and the 
$80,000 per year cost of her children's private university educations. In addition 
to filing numerous objections, Ms. Taylor filed three motions in October, two 
41 
motions in November, and three motions in January, including two Rule 60(b) 
motions, a motion asking the Court to delay the hearing on Mr. Taylor's motion, 
until her Rule 60(b) motion could be decided (citing no authority), and that the 
motion be heard by Judge Henriod (though it did not qualify under Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 101(j)), a contempt motion addressing visitation 
issues(which she had not mediated first in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
38), a contempt motion regarding child support (filed after she had instructed Mr. 
Taylor not to send his check and to stop payment on the checks he had sent, and 
after she had opened a case with the ORS,) and a last moment Emergency 
Motion for Restraining Order, with the stated purpose of "easing strained 
relations" between her, Mr. Taylor and Ms. Schmid (citing no authority.) For 
some of her motions, Ms. Taylor did not send notice but appeared and argued her 
motions should be heard anyway. She filed multiple notices to submit, which 
were not allowed by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 101, and which even 
had they been permissible, contained disparaging comments about Mr. Taylor, 
instead of the information required by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(d.) 
Each of these pleadings had to be opposed, at great cost to Mr. Taylor, and when 
it came time to serve the various oppositions, Ms. Taylor played games to avoid 
service. Ms. Taylor provided only a post office box and though she had a 
residence and two business addresses, and a home and business fax machines, she 
refused to designate a permanent address or provide a fax number where she 
could be served. After receiving Mr. Taylor's oppositions, Ms. Taylor 
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"cancelled" one motion, withdrew another motion, " in the best interests of her 
family/' and told Judge Henriod the day of the hearing she had decided not to 
pursue one motion, but Mr. Taylor was still out his fees. 
H. Again, when began representing herself in October, 2009, and in 
connection with the intensive litigation practice motions, Ms. Taylor barraged 
Ms. Schmid's office with telephone calls and emails, insisting they discuss the 
case, and the one time Ms. Schmid relented, Ms. Taylor misrepresented the 
discussion to the Court. When thereafter Ms. Schmid notified Ms. Taylor her 
office would not be taking her calls as Ms. Schmid needed a record of their 
communications to verify what had occurred, Ms. Taylor threatened to report her 
to the Utah State Bar. Frustrated by her inability to call directly, Ms. Taylor sent 
Ms. Schmid an ongoing series of emails, sometimes as many as six a day, and if 
Ms. Schmid did not respond quickly enough, Ms. Taylor again threatened her 
with the Utah State Bar. Ms. Taylor again raised the specter of the Utah State Bar 
when Ms. Schmid refused to negotiate the issue of child support after Ms. Taylor 
had opened a case with the ORS. Based on the foregoing, Judge Henriod was 
imminently familiar with Ms. Taylor's historic course of conduct when she 
appeared before him at the January 25, 2010, contempt hearing and after 
reviewing the email in which Ms. Taylor responded to Ms. Schmid's inquiry 
about when she would be paying the $41,000 by flippantly stating "[t]he payment 
that is 'due' (lol) Paul from business is going to be paid at the closing for the sale 
of that business," and her request that he simply take her word for it that it would 
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be done, after almost a one month delay, he simply had had enough. In awarding 
fees, Judge Henriod specifically acknowledged Ms. Taylor's legendary pattern 
and practice, as follows: 
The reason for the fees and costs, in addition to the fact that Ms. 
Taylor is in violation of court orders, is that you intentionally engage 
in a course of conduct to make dealings with you all but impossible. 
I have observed this personally over the time that's been in court. 
This includes constantly changing counsel, representing yourself, 
and putting the other party in a position where he has to pay legal fees 
for emails and telephone calls and other matters that are a complete 
waste of time. (R. 02129, 02086, page 26-27.) 
Ms. Taylor's failure to mention this lengthy history of dilatory tactics, failure to 
comply with Court orders and defiant attitude towards the Court and Special Master does not 
satisfy the requirement that she play "devil's advocate," with respect to valid reasons that might 
have supported the Court's ruling. Instead, on appeal she only focused on the two hearings in 
January and February, 2010, and she carefully and deliberately chose only those facts that would 
portray her as an innocent victim who despite her best efforts to comply with the Court's orders 
was unjustly incarcerated. Given Ms. Taylor's failure to marshal the evidence, the appeal must 
be dismissed, and the court's orders should be affirmed. (See Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d at 1196). 
ARGUMENT II 
THE ISSUES ON APPEAL ARE MOOT 
Ms. Taylor has already served her thirty days in jail, although consistent with her 
defiance of Court orders, she has neither paid the $1,000 fine, nor the attorneys' fees and costs of 
$ 5,213.49. While the issue of whether the financial sanctions were excessive remains viable, 
the issue of contempt is moot. 
The Supreme Court of Utah outlined the doctrine of mootness in the case of Ellis v. 
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Swensen. 16 P.3d 1233 (Utah 2000). In Ellis, the court stated: that "[o]rdinarily we will not 
adjudicate an issue when the underlying case is moot. ' A case is deemed moot when the 
requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants.'" (Id. at 1239. (citing Burkett v. 
Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42,44 (Utah 1989).) There is one exception to this doctrine, and that is 
the public interest exception. Under this exception, the court will consider a case that is 
technically moot "when the case presents an issue that affects the public interest, is likely to 
recur, and because of the brief time that any one litigant is affected, is capable of evading 
review." Ellis. 16 P.3d at 1239. This exception applies to issues such as an election 
controversy where a party has already lost the election such as in Ellis v. Swenson. supra. The 
exception does not apply here. 
Applying the standard for mootness to this matter, Ms. Taylor has been found in 
contempt, and has served her jail time. Overturning the contempt finding does not affect Ms. 
Taylor's rights as the time she spent in jail cannot be restored. While such a ruling will 
undoubtedly make Ms. Taylor feel vindicated, her rights for the purposes of this appeal are not 
affected. For these reasons, the appeal of the contempt itself should be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT III 
THE ISSUE OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE FINDINGS WAS NOT PROPERLY 
PRESERVED 
Ms. Taylor argues that the trial court failed to make adequate findings supporting its 
order holding her in contempt. In the section of her brief listing issues and the alleged 
preservation of the issue below, Ms. Taylor claims that the issue of the adequacy of the findings 
was "preserved" at the hearing on January 25, 2010, but her only cite in support of that claim is 
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the transcript of that hearing, beginning at R. 02086. Ms. Taylor has not identified where in the 
transcript she notified the Court that the findings were inadequate, nor does it so appear, so the 
issue was not preserved then. Moreover, whereas Ms. Taylor filed numerous pleadings after the 
hearing, including the Notice of Appeal and Notice of Transcript Request (R.02079-02080), 
(which was the first pleading she filed after the January 25, 2010, hearing), the Objection to the 
Notice of Review Hearing and Request for Continuance (R. 02102 -02107), (wherein she relied 
on the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure), Objection to the Form of the Order Following the 
Hearing on January 25 ( R. 02108 -02110), (wherein she challenged only the format of the order 
because it did not separate the facts, findings and order) and the Affidavit of Respondent with 
Respect to Passports (R. 2111- 02113), (which was not served on opposing counsel.) Ms. Taylor 
failed to file anything, such as a motion under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59, alleging 
the inadequacy of the findings. 
The basic standard for the preservation of issues on appeal is set forth in 438 Main Street v. Easy 
Heat. Inc. 99 P.3d 801, (Utah 2004). In 438 Main Street, as in this case, the Appellant 
challenged the sufficiency of the lower court's findings, arguing that they failed to adequately 
disclose the steps by which the trial court reached its conclusion. In finding that the Appellant 
waived its right to argue this issue, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
'In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be 
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has 
an opportunity to rule on that issue.' This requirement puts the 
trial judge on notice of the asserted error and allows for 
correction at that time in the course of the proceeding. For a trial 
court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error, '(I) the 
issue must be raised in a timely fashion, (2) the issue must be 
specifically raised, and (3) the challenging party must introduce 
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.' 
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Id. at 813. 
In the case of A.O. v. State, 201 P.3d 985 (Utah 2009), the Utah Supreme Court 
distinguished a challenge to the evidentiary support for the court's findings, which is not 
required, from a challenge to the adequacy of the court's findings, which is. 
' A challenge to the adequacy of the court's findings is notably 
different from a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. 'It is one 
thing for a party to say that the judge's findings are erroneous because 
they are contrary to or unsupported by the evidence, and quite another to 
say that the findings are insufficiently detailed.' It would be superfluous 
to demand that a party challenge the evidentiary support for a court's findings 
shortly after the court articulates them. But it is quite a different matter 
and wholly necessary for a party to challenge and thus afford the trial 
court 4an opportunity to correct the alleged error' of inadequately 
detailed findings in order to provide for meaningful appellate review 
of the court's decision.' 
Id. at 999. (citing 483 Main Street v. Easy Heat. Inc. 99 P.3d 801, 813 (Utah 2004).) (Emphasis 
added.) 
This Court cannot meaningfully review the trial court's findings because Ms. Taylor did 
not challenge their inadequacy at the trial court level, as required by the Utah Supreme Court in 
438 Main Street supra. Accordingly, Ms. Taylor's appeal should be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT IV 
EVEN IF THE WRITTEN FINDINGS WERE INADEQUATE, THE RECORD IS 
CLEAR 
Ms. Taylor argues the court failed to make the requisite findings on the issues of 
contempt and purging the contempt, and thus, the order of contempt must be reversed. In Acton 
v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court stated that the "failure of the trial 
court to make findings on all material issues is reversible error unless the facts in the record are 
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'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.'" (Id 
at 999. (cftfrigKinkellav. Baugh. 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983).) 
First, the law is clear. In order for a party to be found in contempt, "the court must find 
from clear and convincing proof that the contemnor knew what was required of her, had the 
ability to comply, and willfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so." Kelly v. Draney, 
754 P. 2d 92, 95 (citing Sinclair v. Sinclair. 718 P.2d 396, 398 (Utah 1986).) 
Applying this standard, the only issues on appeal are whether Ms. Taylor knew what she 
was required to do (which she admitted), whether she had the ability to do so (which she never 
denied and in fact paid the money just shy of the time limit) and whether she failed to pay it to 
Mr. Taylor by January 1, 2010, (which she admitted she did not.) The final issue is whether Ms. 
Taylor successfully purged her contempt, which is also clearly supported by the record, since she 
admitted did not pay the money to Mr. Taylor within twenty four hours. The other arguments 
made by her on appeal amount to asking this court to substitute its judgment for that of the lower 
court. This court is not in that business, especially where, as here, the issue of contempt and 
sanctions for contempt are within the discretion of the trial court. For this reason, the lower 
court orders should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT V 
MS. TAYLOR'S CONDUCT THROUGHOUT THIS ACTION SUPPORTS THE 
COURT'S IMPOSITION OF CONTEMPT AND SANCTIONS ARE APPROPRIATE 
Ms. Taylor argues that she tried to pay the money on a timely basis; that the issue of the 
passports had nothing to do with anything; and the court imposed improper sanctions. 
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A. "THE ATTEMPT" TO PAY THE $41,000 
Ms. Taylor claims she should have been excused from meeting the court's deadline for 
purging her contempt because she "tried" to deliver the money, Ms. Taylor's analysis is 
simplistic and does not take into account all of her conduct which surrounded "the attempt". 
First, "the attempt" must be viewed in the light of the history of this case tediously 
enumerated in the Statement of Facts and parts of which are summarized in Argument I, above. 
Moreover "the attempt" must be viewed in the light of Ms. Taylor's conduct at the hearing on 
January 25,2010. 
At the hearing, Ms. Taylor began by representing to the court that she was selling her 
business at the end of the month and that she would pay Mr. Taylor from the proceeds. (Note 
she did not claim that she was unable to pay it otherwise, and she did pay it on January 30th.) 
With respect to the sale of the business and the proceeds, Ms. Taylor never submitted any 
documentation whatsoever to support the fact that the business was for sale, was closing at the 
end of the month, or that there would be sufficient funds to pay Mr. Taylor. Although she was a 
month late and knew at least 14 days in advance that she would have to explain her failure to pay 
the money to the Court, Ms. Taylor just expected everyone to take her word for it. As described 
above, Ms. Taylor has a distinguished track record of making representations, such as that she 
agreed with Dr. Hale's recommendations (which took nine months and two court hearings to 
finally implement), that Mr. Taylor could review her records with her accountant in lieu of her 
producing them (which took eight months and one court hearing only to have it not happen), and 
she really had gone to divorce education class (when she did not provide the certificate.) 
Next, Ms. Taylor tried to blame the absence of a signed release for holding up the 
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payment of the $41,000. This argument failed after Ms. Schmid pointed out she was aware of 
the request for a release and though she had advised Ms. Taylor she would need to see it first 
before she could advise her client to sign it, Ms. Taylor never provided one. 
Then, Ms. Taylor floated another familiar argument in her arsenal; to wit, in her opinion, 
her payment was not due because the court should clear up the financial dealings from 2009 (e.g. 
the child support she claimed he owed her) before the financial issues for 2010 (e.g. the money 
she owes him.) The Court rejected this just as it had Ms. Taylor's unsuccessful attempt to delay 
the hearing on Mr. Taylor's motion in November, 2009, on the grounds her motion should be 
decided first. 
Turning to the actual "attempt" to pay Mr. Taylor, the check was not ready until 30 
minutes past the deadline, according to Ms. Taylor's own accountant. (R. 02092.) Moreover, 
Ms. Taylor unilaterally imposed conditions that impeded the availability of the check within 24 
hours, such as that Mr. Taylor had to get it and it would not be given to him without him signing 
a release first. Ms. Taylor then claimed that she tried to deliver it to Mr. Taylor that night at his 
home, but that was also past the deadline. Not only is there no evidence other than Ms. Taylor's 
word supporting her assertion, but had she gone to Mr. Taylor's home she would be in contempt 
of the restraining orders entered in this matter. While the check was finally delivered to Ms. 
Schmid the next morning, Ms. Taylor was still in contempt. 
In her brief, Ms. Taylor accuses Ms. Schmid of having been unreasonable to have 
advised the Court she was in contempt given Ms. Taylor's "attempts" to pay within the deadline 
and the fact that it was paid the very next morning. Frankly, if that had been Ms. Taylor's only 
transgression, Ms. Schmid would probably have left well enough alone and in fact, Ms. Schmid 
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did not advise the Court immediately. But then, consistent with Ms. Taylor's conduct for the 
past five years, to wit, that she simply cannot comply with court orders, Ms. Taylor tried to 
sabotage the passport application by writing the words "signed under duress" under her 
signature. Regardless of whether the State Department issued the passport or whether Mr. Taylor 
could have gotten the passport without her signature (as she subsequently argued to the Court) 
including the phrase was an open and intentional defiance of a direct court order. The 
combination of these facts compelled Ms. Schmid to bring the issue to the court's attention. 
The Court had every reason to find that Ms. Taylor had not purged her contempt. Ms. 
Taylor did not pay Mr. Taylor the $41,000 within twenty four hours by her own admission. 
Judge Henriod was very careful to emphasize to Ms. Taylor that if it did not happen as ordered, 
he would be issuing a bench warrant for her arrest. Ms. Taylor signed the passport application 
"under duress" and then argued she did not have to obey the Court's direct order because federal 
law offers an alternative. There can be no question that Ms. Taylor knew what was required. 
She did not argue she was unable to comply with either requirement, and it is clear based upon 
the transparency of the attempt to pay the $41,000 and her attempt to sabotage the passport, that 
she intentionally failed to do so. The Court properly found that she had not purged her 
contempt. 
B. IT WAS NOT ERROR TO CONDITION THE PURGING OF CONTEMPT UPON 
HER SIGNING THE PASSPORTS AND MS. TAYLOR WAS NOT FOUND IN 
CONTEMPT FOR FAILING TO SIGN THE PASSPORTS 
Ms. Taylor argues the court exceeded its authority in ordering her to sign the passport 
application as a requirement of her purging her contempt. Ms. Taylor offers no statutory or case 
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law to support her argument. The Court rejected Ms. Taylor's attempt to challenge the Special 
Master's authority to order her to obtain a passport for their child, thus affirming the order. 
Then, when Mr. Taylor brought a motion to enforce the Special Master's order, asking that she 
be held in contempt of court for refusing to sign the passport, Judge Henriod simply gave her a 
deadline for doing so. This is also not without precedent in this case, since in the past, the Judge 
had to give Ms. Taylor five minutes to sign Dr. Hale's contract forms, 24 hours to sign the bank 
releases and a set date in order to exact her appearance at her deposition. Given that Ms. Taylor 
had been playing games with this issue since May, 2009, Ms. Taylor's time was up. Requiring 
her to sign the passport within five days was an appropriate element to add to the purging of her 
contempt for failing to pay the $41,000. 
In a related argument, Ms. Taylor insists she was held in contempt for failure to sign the 
passport, which is in error. The record makes clear that, while signing the passport was a 
condition of purging contempt, Ms. Taylor was only held in contempt for her failure to pay the 
$41,000 by January 1, 2010, and then failing to purge that contempt. In the January 25th hearing, 
the court clearly rules as follows: 
Ms. Taylor is in contempt for failing to pay the $41,000 when 
due. For her contempt, I'm sentencing her to 30 days in the 
Tooele County Jail, plus $1,000 fine. I'm going to allow her 
to purge the contempt by getting the passports done within 
five days and paying the $41,000 within 24 hours. I'm also 
awarding fees and costs to Mr. Taylor. 
(R. 02086 at page 26, lines 13 through 18) 
For these reasons, both of Ms. Taylor's arguments about the inclusion of the passports must fail. 
C. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES IS SUPPORTED BY LAW 
With respect to the sanctions themselves, Ms. Taylor argues that, pursuant to Utah Code 
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Ann. § 78B-6-310, the court only has the authority to sentence Ms. Taylor up to thirty days in 
jail and impose a fine not to exceed $1,000, which renders the order that she pay Mr. Taylor's 
attorney's fees (which she has not paid) excessive. To the contrary, a court also has authority to 
award indemnity or a compensatory fine in contempt cases. In the case of Kelly v. Dranev, 754 
P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988), the Court of Appeals found that "[a] court has power in a contempt 
proceeding to award indemnity or a compensatory fine when authorized to do so by statute." Id. 
at 95. In Utah, courts are so empowered. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-311: 
If an actual loss or injury to a party in an action or special 
proceeding is caused by the contempt, the court, in lieu of 
or in addition to the fine and imprisonment imposed for the 
contempt, may order the person proceeded against to pay 
the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient to indemnify 
him and to satisfy his costs and expenses. The order and 
the acceptance of money under it is a bar to an action by the 
aggrieved party for the loss and injury. 
(Emphasis added.) 
This is exactly what happened to Ms. Taylor. As Judge Henriod stated: 
The reason for the fees and costs, in addition to the fact that 
Ms. Taylor is in violation of court orders, is that you 
intentionally engage in a course of conduct to make dealings 
with you all but impossible. I have observed this personally 
over the time that's been in court. This includes constantly 
changing counsel, representing yourself, and putting the 
other party in a position where he has to pay legal fees for 
emails and telephone calls and other matters that are a 
complete waste of time. 
(R. 02129, 02086, page 26-27.) 
Thus it was not an abuse of discretion to award Mr. Taylor attorney's fees and costs, in addition 
to the imprisonment and the fine. The award is supported by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-311. The 
award of attorney's fees and costs of $5, 213.39 should be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT VI 
MR. TAYLOR IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF HIS ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
ON APPEAL 
This appeal is more of the litigious behavior Ms. Taylor has exhibited in this matter. 
Even if this Court considers the appeal despite her failure to preserve the issue of insufficient 
findings and to marshal the evidence, what will she gain if the lower court is reversed? Her 
contempt may be overturned but the Court cannot turn back the hands of time and restore the 
days she spent in jail. Since Ms. Taylor has not paid her fine, the Court can still wipe the slate 
clean and relieve her from the judgment of $5,213.39, but the reality is that given the exorbitant 
costs of pursuing the appeal, paying the fine and attorney's fees would have saved her money in 
the long run. 
In the course of having to respond to Ms. Taylor's quest for vindication, Mr. Taylor has 
incurred attorney's fees and costs far in excess of the attorney's fees and costs he incurred 
below. Ms. Taylor also filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief with the Utah Supreme Court 
and though she was ultimately unsuccessful, Mr. Taylor was forced to incur yet more attorney 
fees and costs preparing an opposition. The two Objections Ms. Taylor filed after the July 25, 
the Petition for Extraordinary Relief, and the instant appeal amply support and reinforce Judge 
Henriod's finding that "[Ms Taylor] intentionally engage[s] in a course of conduct putting 
the other party in a position where he has to pay legal fees for emails and telephone calls and 
other matters that are a complete waste of time." (R. 02129, 02086, page 26-27.) 
As indicated by the Utah Court of Appeals, "[i]n divorce proceedings, when the trial 
court has awarded attorneys fees below to the party who then prevails on the main issues on 
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appeal, we generally award fees on appeal." fWall v. Wall. 157 P.2d 341 (Utah Ct. App 2007) 
(citing Childs v. Childs. 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).) Since Mr. Taylor prevailed 
on all issues presented at the January and February hearings, in that his request for a finding of 
contempt was granted, along with the majority of the terms in his Motions, and Ms. Taylor's 
motions were all denied, he should be awarded his attorney's fees and costs on appeal. This 
matter should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of the amount of those fees. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, Appellant's Appeal should be dismissed, with prejudice 
and Appellee should be awarded his attorneys fees and costs incurred on appeal. 
DATED this 1*1* day of November, 2010. 
SCHMID & LUHN, P.C. 
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